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________________________________________________________________________ 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
______________________________________________________________________ 
    
DAVID PYPER    )  
 ) BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
     ) 
Plaintiff-Appellee,   )  
) 
vs.      ) Case No: 20080906-CA 
  ) 
JUSTIN C. BOND, DALE M.  ) ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED 
and ALISON D. BOND   ) 
Defendants-Appellants  ) 
) 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
APPEAL FROM A FINAL ORDER OF THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE DAVID MOWER, PRESIDING 
_______________________________________________________________________ 
Brian Queesenberry       Jennifer Reyes 
River View Plaza       Dorius & Reyes 
4844 North 300 West      29 S. Main Street  
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III.     JURISDICTION 
This appeal is taken after a Sixth District Court evidentiary hearing held on June 
23, 2008.  The trial court issued a memorandum decision on August 29, 2008, and a final 
order on October 16, 2008. 
IV.  STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE(S) & STANDARD(S) OF REVIEW 
 The issue before the Court is as follows: 
Whether the trial court erred in ruling the November 9, 2006, sheriff’s sale involving 
Appellee’s real property should be set aside, even though Appellee failed to follow 
the redemption rules and let the redemption period expire.   
 
A. DETERMINITIVE LAW 
 
1. Rule 69C. Redemption of real property after sale. 
 
(a) Right of redemption. Real property may be redeemed unless the estate is less than a 
leasehold of a two-years' unexpired term, in which case the sale is absolute. 
(b) Who may redeem. Real property subject to redemption may be redeemed by the 
defendant or by a creditor having a lien on the property junior to that on which the 
property was sold or by their successors in interest. If the defendant redeems, the effect of 
the sale is terminated and the defendant is restored to the defendant's estate. If the 
property is redeemed by a creditor, any other creditor having a right of redemption may 
redeem. 
(c) How made. To redeem, the redemptioner shall pay the amount required to the 
purchaser and shall serve on the purchaser: 
(c)(1) a certified copy of the judgment or lien under which the redemptioner claims the 
right to redeem; 
(c)(2) an assignment, properly acknowledged if necessary to establish the claim; and 
(c)(3) an affidavit showing the amount due on the judgment or lien. 
(d) Time for redemption. The property may be redeemed within 180 days after the sale. 
 
2. Huston vs. Lewis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991). 
It is well established that the right of redemption is a substantive right to be exercised in 
strict accord with statutory terms.  Not only is the right of redemption substantive, but also we 
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have stated that the procedures for redemption often confer substantive rights.  Generally, 
therefore, when the procedure at issue affects the substantive rights of the parties, the procedure 
should be followed strictly in order to not interfere with those rights.  
3. Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977). 
 Notwithstanding the foregoing, a court, sitting in equity, may in 
appropriate instances extend the period.  This Court has recognized that equitable 
principle by setting aside a sale after the time for redemption had expired, when 
the sale was attended by such substantial irregularities as must have prevented a 
sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor’s property.  
4. Young v. Schroeder,  37 P 252 (Supreme Court of the Territory of Utah 1894).   The Supreme Court set forth a two‐part test for setting aside a sheriff sale after the redemption period had lapsed. The Court held that sales can be set aside if there is a gross inadequacy of price, coupled with the irregularities attending the sale, unless the complaining party is stopped by his own laches.   
 B. STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The issue before this Court, whether the Trial Court erred in ruling that although 
Appellee failed to follow the redemption rules and let the redemption period expire, the 
November 9, 2006 Sherriff’s sale should be said aside, is a question of common law. Under Utah 
law, questions of common law interpretations are questions of law which the appellate court is 
well suited to address, and thus the appellate court gives “no deference to the trial court’s ruling 
but review it for correctness.”  Trujillo v. Jenkins, 840 P.2d 777, 778-79 (Utah 1992). 
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V.   STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A.  Nature of the Case; Course of Proceedings & Disposition in Court Below. 
This case arises out of a judgment entered on behalf of Appellants and against 
Appellee.  Appellants attempted to collect on a judgment owed by Appellee to Appellants 
by executing on property owned by Appellee at a sheriff’s sale.  On September 12, 2006, 
the Sheriff issued a certificate of sale for Appellee’s property after posting written notice 
of time, date, and place of sale.  Notice of the sale was also published in the Sanpete 
County Messenger.  
The Sheriff’s sale was held on November 9, 2006, at the Sanpete County 
Courthouse.  Appellant Justin C. Bond purchased the property at the Sheriff’s sale.  
Appellee failed to tender the redemption prior to May 9, 2007, (180 days after the 
Sheriff’s sale).  After the redemption period ended, Sheriff Kevin G. Holman issued a 
Sheriff’s deed to Appellant. 
On June 26, 2007, Appellee filed an action in the Sixth District Court seeking to 
set aside the Sheriff’s sale and redeem the property.  An evidentiary hearing was held on 
June 23, 2008.  Subsequently, the Court issued a memorandum decision and a final order 
(Exhibits 1 and 2), which set aside the November 9, 2006 Sheriff’s sale. 
VI. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. DORIUS BOND REYES & LINARES (The Firm) began representing Appellee as 
personal representative of the Estate of Molly Pyper in the summer of 2002 until the Court 
signed an order of withdrawal in April 2004. (R. 450 page180) 
  7 
2. The Firm represented Appellee in a probate action.  Appellee was appointed the personal 
representative. (R. 450 page 1181). 
3. The Firm also represented Appellee in an eviction action against Appellee’s sister Debra 
Lambson who was living in a home owned by the Estate of Molly Pyper. (R. 450 page 181-182) 
4. Appellee’s sister, Debra Lambson contested every aspect of the probate action.  Lambson 
attempted to remove Appellee as the personal representative, Lambson challenged the informal 
probate, Lambson made claims of fraud, negligence, etc. (R. 450 page 181-182) 
5. In the eviction action, Lambson filed a Counterclaim containing seven causes of action 
and over one hundred paragraphs.  Lambson’s claims were Negligent Misrepresentation, 
Intentional/Fraudulent Misrepresentation, Foreclosure of Mechanics Lien, Violation of the 
Probate Code, Quantum Meruit, and Breach of Fiduciary Duty. (R. 450 page 181-184) 
6. Appellee was successful in all aspects of the case, and the probate action, the eviction and 
the counterclaim were resolved. (R. 450 page 181-185) 
7. During the Firm’s representation of Appellee, there was a substantial accrual of attorney 
fees.  In addition, there were substantial costs regarding the probate action, such as notice to 
creditors, title reports, etc.  The Firm paid for these expenses. (R. 450 page 195) 
8. Appellee made several small payments but repeatedly ignored the billing statements. The 
Firm withdrew in April 2004.   
9. A Notice of Lien was recorded with the County Recorder on July 21, 2004.  A copy was 
sent to Appellee. (R. 450 page 197) 
10. A Notice of Lien was also filed with the Sixth District Court on July 21, 2004.  A Copy 
was sent to Appellee. (R. 450 page 197) 
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11. On December 10, 2004, the Firm filed an action with the Sixth District Court to collect 
the outstanding Attorney Fees.  The Firm obtained a judgment in the sum of $10,577.23.   Prior 
to and after obtaining the Judgment, Appellee filed several Chapter 13 bankruptcies. The 
bankruptcies filed by Appellee were dismissed. R. (R. 168) 
12. The firm filed Motions for Relief from the automatic stay regarding the firm’s attorneys’ 
fees, all of which were granted. (R. 168) 
13. The attorneys’ fees owed to the firm survived the bankruptcy proceedings filed by 
Appellee, and the firm moved forward with attempts to collect the debt. (R. 168) 
14. Pyper did not contact the firm to make payments, discuss the debt or negotiate the 
settlement or any other matter. (R. 168) 
15. A writ of execution was issued, and Appellee was served personally on September 22, 
2006. (R. 450 p 198) 
16. A sheriff recorded a Notice of Levy on September 21, 2006, and recorded a Certificate of 
Summary Judgment with the Sanpete County Recorder. (R. 168) 
17. On September 21, 2006, the Sheriff issued a Certificate of Sale after posting written 
notice of time, date and place of sale and posting said notice twenty-one (21) days on the 
property and at the place of sale, Sanpete Courthouse and three (3) places in the precinct where 
the property is located.  Notice of Sale was advertised in the Sanpete Messenger for three (3) 
issues, once a week in successive weeks prior to the sale.  The Sheriff scheduled a sale of the 
property on November 9, 2006. (R. 168) 
18. The Sheriff’s sale was held on November 9, 2006, at the Sanpete County Courthouse. (R. 
450 p 198) 
19. Justin C. Bond of the firm purchased the property at said sale. (R. 450 p 198) 
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20. After the redemption period of 180 days, Sheriff Kevin G. Holman issued a Sheriff’s 
Deed to Justin C. Bond.  (R. 450 p 202) 
21. Prior to the redemption period expiring, Dale Dorius spoke personally with Appellee.   
Appellee did not request a payoff amount. (R. 450 p 212) 
22.  Appellee offered $8,500.00 payable at a future date to pay off the attorney fee debt.  The 
payoff amount at that time was approximately $12,000.00. (R. 450 p 212) 
23. Further, Appellee did not have the funds available to pay off any judgment amount.   
Appellee merely requested the firm remove the lien so that Appellee could obtain a loan. (R. 
450 p 212) 
24. After the substantial amount of time that had passed, during which Appellee ignored the 
Firm’s attempt to resolve this debt, filed frivolous bankruptcies, and made misleading 
statements, Dorius did not believe the Firm could trust any negotiations made by Appellee.   
Appellees settlement offer appeared simply to be another stall tactic by Appellee to avoid 
paying the debt owed to the Firm. (R. 450 p 200-202) 
25. At no time did Appellee request a payoff amount. (R. 450 p 212) 
26. At no time did Appellee tender money with the Court as required by law.  At no time did 
Appellee deliver certified funds to the Firm.  (R. 406) 
27. Prior to the elapse of the redemption period, Appellee did nothing other than make an 
unacceptable offer and did not have the funds to pay that offer. (R. 450 p 212) 
28. The Firm followed all rules, statutes, notice requirements, service requirements, time 





VII.   SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Trial Court erred in ruling that the November 9, 2006 Sherriff’s sale should be set aside 
even though Appellee failed to follow the redemption rules and let the redemption period expire.   
The Trial Court further erred in finding that the inadequacy of price alone was a 
sufficient basis to set aside the Sheriff’s sale. 
VIII.   ARGUMENT 
I. The Trial Court erred in ruling that even though Appellee failed to follow the  
redemption rules and let the redemption period expire, the November 9, 
2006, Sherriff’s sale should be set aside. 
 On November 9, 2006, a Sheriff’s sale was held in the above action after the Sheriff 
issued proper notice regarding the time, place and date of the sale.  Appellee received notice of 
the Sheriff’s sale.  Appellant was the only person to show up at the sale and purchased 
Appellee’s property for $329.50.  Appellee failed to tender the required redemption funds, and 
the 180-day redemption period lapsed.  After the redemption period lapsed the Sanpete County 
Sheriff issued a sheriff’s deed to Appellant.  Appellee filed an action in the Sixth District Court 
to have the Sheriff’s sale set aside. 
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on June 23, 2008, and ultimately set aside 
the Sheriff’s sale.  The trial court ruled that the inadequacy of price between the value of the 















  In Mollerup v. Storage Systems International, 569 P.2d 1122 (Utah 1977), the Supreme Court also focused on whether a sale was attended by substantial irregularities ,which prevented the property from being sold at a fair price.   In Mollerup, Moench was the successful bidder at a Sheriff’s sale and acquired property owned by Martins.  Martins then filed a bankruptcy petition.  The six‐month redemption period expired, but the lower court extended the redemption period for 45 days.  The lower court then extended the redemption period again for 45 days.  The sole question in the appeal was the power of the lower courts to extend the redemption period.  The Court held that a court may extend a redemption period under certain circumstances; however, the court found those circumstances were not present and those extensions were vacated.   The Court stated, [T]he  right  of  redemption  has  long  been  recognized  as  a  substantive right to be exercised in strict accord with statutory terms.  It is not an equitable right created or regulated by principles of equity but, rather, is a creature of statute and depends entirely upon the provisions of the statute creating the right.    




 The present matter can be distinguished from Mollerup.  In the present action there is no 
basis for setting aside the sale based on substantial irregularities.  The writ of execution was 
conducted in strict compliance with the rules.  The Sheriff conducted the sale after all proper 
notices and requirements had been followed.  The trial court did not make any findings 
regarding substantial irregularities attending the sale. 
 In the trial court’s memorandum, the trial court merely makes findings that the 
inadequacy of price was so gross as. . .to shock the conscience of all fair and impartial minds.  
However, the trial court ended its findings at that point.  The trial court did not go on to make 
any findings that the Sheriff’s sale was attended by substantial irregularities.      Finally the Mollerup Court stated,   The  Court  has  also  considered  the  matter  of  bankruptcy  after foreclosure and sale and has determined that such does not extend the time of redemption.  If the bankrupt, or his trustee, fails to exercise 
the  right  of  redemption during  the period provided by  law,  that 
right is lost.  
Id (emphasis added). 
 In the present action, Appellee did not exercise his right of redemption and the trial court 
improperly held that the inadequacy of price alone was sufficient to set aside the Sheriff’s sale.  
The trial court improperly ruled that the gross inadequacy of price alone was sufficient to set 
aside the Sheriff’s sale.  The court did not make any findings that Appellants somehow 
prevented the property from being sold at a fair price.   In Huston v. Louis, 818 P.2d 531 (Utah 1991), the Court refused to extend a redemption period on equitable grounds.  In Huston, Stateline Properties purchased the 
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IX.  CONCLUSION 
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  In conclusion, Appellants acted in all ways fair and in accordance with the rules and procedures.  The sale was conducted pursuant to the Rule of Civil Procedure and carried out by the Sheriff.  Appellants have expended a substantial amount of time, effort and expense in obtaining the execution, and are still expending time, effort and expense responding to Appellee’s attempts to skirt the rules, misrepresent the facts and frustrate the process.  Appellee failed to redeem the property within 180‐days of the sale.   Finally, the trial court improperly applied the case law in this action.  The trial court merely found that gross inadequacy of price alone warrants setting aside the Sheriff’s sale.  As outlined above, the sale must also be attended by substantial irregularities, which 
prevent a sale at a fair sum, resulting in a gross sacrifice of the judgment creditor’s property. 
 Based on the above, the Appellate Court should reverse the trial court’s decision to set 
aside the Sheriff’s sale and vest the property at issue in this action to Appellants.  
DATED this ___________ day of February, 2009. 




Jennifer Reyes, Attorney for Appellants 
 
 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this ___day of February, 2008, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellants to be served upon the following: 
 
Brian Queesenberry 
River View Plaza   
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4844 North 300 West 






Jennifer Reyes, Attorney for Appellants 
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 ADDENDUM 
